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Achieving Supreme Excellence: How China Is Using
Agreements with ASEAN to Overcome Obstacles to Its
Leadership in Asian Regional Economic Integration
Juliana W. Chen*
I. INTRODUCTION
HuJintao's first visit to the White House as China's president in April 2006
made headlines, but for reasons Hu may want to forget. The White House
refused to offer him a state dinner fit for the head of such a large country,
instead dubbing Hu's trip a "working visit."' In addition, Hu was greeted by
protesters, including one who interrupted his address on the White House lawn,
and a White House announcer referred to China using the formal name of
Taiwan.2 These protocol indiscretions and gaffes arguably indicate that in some
respects China lacks the status of a recognized world leader. China, however, is
trying to change that perception, at least with regard to economic matters.
According to Sun Tzu, "supreme excellence consists in breaking the
enemy's resistance without fighting."3 Today, Sun Tzu's axiom assumes a new
meaning as China attempts to become the leader of Asian regional economic
integration despite encountering some stubborn roadblocks, namely intra-region
rivalries and diplomatic complications involving Japan, Taiwan, and South
Korea. China's solution to the problem has not been to flex its political and
military muscles, but rather to use negotiation and diplomacy. Indeed, China has
taken a proactive approach to crafting international agreements, particularly with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), in order to overcome
obstacles to its ultimate goal of leading economic regionalism.
Before delving deeper, a preface on what is meant by "Asian region" and
"regionalism" would be useful. In the context of economic integration, the
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Asian region typically has encompassed "ASEAN Plus Three," the ten members
of ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) as well as China,
Japan, and South Korea.4 More recently, however, India, Australia, and New
Zealand have made strides toward inclusion within this framework.' This
Comment considers the addition of these countries, though not in great detail.
With regard to "regionalism" and its variants, this Comment uses the term
synonymously with economic integration, which is consistent with existing
literature.6
Economic regionalism in Asia was once a pipe dream, given the history of
animosity between Asian countries and their seemingly incompatible models of
economic development. Now, however, economic integration is becoming an
increasingly important reality. While Asia is less economically integrated than the
European Union ("EU") or the North American Free Trade Area ("NAFTA"),
the Asian economies continue to push toward an East Asian Community
("EAC") to balance such institutions in the West. Asia has the economic
capacity to compete with other regional trade blocs.' What Asia needs is a leader
to bring some version of the EAC to fruition. As Ong Keng Yong, the
Secretary-General of ASEAN, stated in his opening address at the 2004 ASEAN
Leadership Forum in Kuala Lumpur:
Leadership must discern, reconcile and maximize the complementarities of
regional integration, competitiveness and community building while
mitigating their inherent contradictions. We need to lead our competition
into positive sum situations; preserve our national identities and cultural
diversity.., blend our national interests with the regional interests; and
craft a balance in the exercise of national sovereignty with shared
responsibility and a sense of community. These are the challenges of our
4

See, for example, Eric Teo Chu Cheow, New Challengesfor Building an East Asian Communiy, 5.2
China Brief
8 (Jan 18, 2005), available online at <http://www.jamestown.org/
pubications-details.php?volume id=408&issueid=3201&articleid=2369111> (visited Jan 15,
2007) (discussing the importance of ASEAN Plus Three in the "pan-East Asian regional
framework'). See also M. Ulric Killion, Chinese Regionalism and the 2004 ASEAN-China Accord. The
WTO and Legalized Trade Distorion, 31 NC J Intl L & Comm Reg 1, 49 (2005) (stating, in the
context of regional security, "The region known as the Asia-Pacific does not include South Asia
(India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka), or Southwest Asia (the Arab Peninsula,
Iraq, and Iran). Instead, the Asia-Pacific refers to the region comprising East Asia and Southeast
Asia.").
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(1999).

7

See Seung Park, The Asian Economy in the 21st Centu7, Korea Economic Institute and Brookings
Institution Invitational Lecture (Sept 26, 2005), available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/
fp/cnaps/events/park20050926.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007) (noting expert forecasts that the
Asian economy will surpass the economies of North America and Europe in terms of scale).

117,

9 (cited in note 4).

Vol 7No. 2

Achieving Supreme Excellence

Chen

times that require leadership to lift our vision to higher sights and raise our
deeds to new heights. 8
Although these remarks were directed at government officials from ASEAN
member states, Yong's call for leadership is applicable to the entire Asian region.
This Comment argues that not only does China seek to be the leader of
Asian economic integration, but also that it is using international agreements
with ASEAN to break barriers to the fulfilment of its leadership aspirations.
Section II provides a brief summary of the history of Asian regional economic
integration and an analysis of the status quo. Section III highlights the economic
and political motivations behind China's desire to lead Asian regionalism.
Section IV examines some of the obstacles to Chinese leadership, namely
Japan's concurrent leadership aspirations, China's inability to control Taiwan,
and South Korea's potential as the dark horse leader of Asian regionalism. It also
discusses how China has used agreements with ASEAN to circumvent those
barriers to its leadership. Section V offers some concluding remarks about
China's future prospects for leading a potential East Asian Community.
II. ASIAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
PAST AND PRESENT
Asia is subdivided into several overlapping regional associations, both de
facto and formalized.9 Principal among these groups are the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum ("APEC")'0 and ASEAN.
A. APEC
Although APEC is not purely "Asian" because its membership includes
countries that are not located geographically within the Asian region, it remains

Ong Keng Yong, Leadership Challenges in the 21st Centugy Southeast Asia: Regional Integration,
Competitiveness and Communiy Building, Opening Address at the ASEAN Leadership Forum 28
(Mar 22, 2004), available online at <http://www.aseansec.org/16017.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
9
Some groups that will not be discussed in depth but are worth mentioning include Australia and
New Zealand, which strengthened economic cooperation through the Australia New Zealand
Closer Economic Trade Relations Agreement ("ANZCERTA"); the CLMV grouping comprised
of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam-a subset of ASEAN membership; and JACIK,
which includes ASEAN Plus Three as well as India.
10 APEC has twenty-one "Member Economies": Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile;
People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia;
Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Republic of the Philippines; The Russian
Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; US; and Vietnam. For more information, see
About APEC, available online at <http://www.apec.org/apec/about-apec.html> (visited Jan 15,
8
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influential in the area of Asian economic integration." At APEC's inception in

1989, the Three Chinas-China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong-were excluded. By
design, APEC initially lacked a formalized institutional framework. Indeed, two
of APEC's largest economies, the US and Japan, eschewed the establishment of
such a framework in favor of using APEC as a vehicle for informal
consultation. 2 However, a few years after the Three Chinas were invited to
participate in APEC in 1990, APEC leaders established a permanent secretariat,
signed a Declaration of Trade and Investment Framework and Action Plan, and
created a Committee on Trade and Investment. 3 Moreover, as part of APEC's
increasing institutionalization, APEC members promulgated the Bogor
Declaration to create a free trade area by 2020.14 Subsequently, APEC leaders
also agreed that each member economy would produce an Individual Action
Plan that detailed how, it intended to liberalize trade by the target dates. Despite
5
these ambitions, such plans were often described as inadequate.
Although APEC has ambitiously attempted to replicate the EU and World
Trade Organization agendas, its efforts have been insufficient to overcome
fundamental, inherent flaws. Its diversified membership has resulted in collective
action problems, prisoners' dilemmas, and mutual suspicion among individual
member economies. In particular, the failure of larger economies, such as the US
and Japan, to promulgate bolder proposals for trade liberalization has set a
conservative tone among lesser-developed member economies, which would not
consider opening their markets unless developed members did so as well.' 6
Furthermore, many APEC members operate in an environment akin to "highstakes trade poker" in which the economy that initiates trade liberalization
exposes itself to greater competition without necessarily gaining reciprocal
concessions, resulting in a sort of prisoners' dilemma.'"
Perhaps more importanty, ASEAN countries within APEC have
expressed doubts about expanding APEC's scope. A primary concern among
joint members of ASEAN and APEC is that APEC will evolve into an

11

12

See Thomas C. Fischer, A Commentary on Regional Instituions in the Padfic Rim: Do APEC and
ASEAN Sill Matter?, 13 Duke J Comp & Intl L 337, 343 (2003) ("APEC clearly has influence, so
it would be wrong to treat it as less than a de facto organization.').
Harold Dichter, Legal Implications of an Asia-Pacific Economic Grouping, 16 U Pa J Intl Bus L 99,
126-27 (1995).
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14

Fischer, 13 DukeJ Comp & Intl L at 343 (cited in note 11).

15

Id at 345.

16

Id at 346.

17

Id at 345.

Vol. 7 No. 2

Chen

Achieving Supreme Excellence

instrument of US foreign policy.' 8 Consequently, APEC's role in Asian
economic integration is constrained by the diversity of its potential membership.
An exclusively Asian association with a strong leader thus appears to be the only
plausible vehicle for successful regional integration.
B. ASEAN
ASEAN was founded in 1967 as a means of securing peace, stability, and
development in Southeast Asia. It began with just half of the countries in the
region-Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand-and
gradually incorporated the remaining countries until it formally included all ten
Southeast Asian nations in 1999. With the specter of communism looming
during the 1970s, ASEAN members quickly adopted two treaties to foster
greater economic cooperation, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, both signed at the
1976 Bali Summit. 9
The rise of trade blocs in Europe and North America during the 1990s
inspired calls for deeper economic integration within ASEAN." Such calls
culminated in the seminal ASEAN Free Trade Agreement ("AFTA") in 1992.
AFTA's ultimate purpose is to increase ASEAN's competitive edge in the world
market, an objective that China has for itself. While ASEAN and China's twin
goals would seem to put them in competition with one another, AFTA may
actually create an opening for one
of the larger Asian-Pacific economies, such as
21
economy.
its
expand
to
China,
In contrast to APEC, ASEAN has a relatively homogeneous membership.
Indeed, it is comprised of lesser-developed economies, which is both a strength
and a liability. On the one hand, ASEAN members are unified by a shared
resentment of the West and its domineering politicians.22 Yet it is the lesserdeveloped nature of ASEAN members that also hinders the regional
association's competitive edge in the global marketplace. At the turn of this
century, for instance, the ten member countries of ASEAN received only a
fraction of the foreign direct investment that flowed into China, a trend that is
18

Dichter, 16 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 130 (cited in note 12).

19

Lay Hong Tan, Wi//ASEAN Economic IntegralionProgressbeyond a Free Trade Area?, 53 Intl & Comp

20

L Q 935 (2004).
Id at 938.

21

See Dichter, 16 U Pa J Ind Bus L at 135 (cited in note 12) (stating that AFTA, as a "manifestation
of the desire to create Asian alternatives to the regional trading blocs which are developing
around the world and a response to the threat of regionalism posed by the [EU] and NAFTA,"
"serves as an institutional framework upon which others might build.").
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likely to continue. 23 Although China (as well as Japan and South Korea) has a
larger economy than the members of ASEAN, it needs the support of these
lesser-developed states in order to promote economic regionaism. 24 Thus, a
symbiotic relationship exists within the ASEAN Plus Three framework.
At present, the ASEAN Plus Three bloc, or a subset thereof, is the most
promising vehicle for Asian regional economic integration. As it currently
stands, however, ASEAN Plus Three lacks a strong leader. 25 The question that
remains is whether China can be such a leader, filling the role of the nucleus
already present in other major regional economic blocs.
In addition to the agreements that China has forged with ASEAN
(discussed infra), Chinese leaders have exercised diplomatic tact in their
courtship with ASEAN. Chinese ministers have been careful to avoid the
appearance of having plans to dominate the movement toward Asian
regionalism, preferring instead to generate harmonious feelings toward China
among ASEAN members. For instance, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has touted
China as a "gentle and friendly elephant" to its smaller Asian counterparts. 26
Moreover, China has willingly played the part of a gracious guest at various
ASEAN summits. 27 Perhaps China is assuming a non-threatening stance in order
to avoid stirring the type of resentment that ASEAN members have toward the
West. This strategy may be working.
The current state of competition for leadership of Asian economic
regionalism is that of a tug-of-war between Japan and China. 28 While Japan is
intensifying its clout with ASEAN members, China has already established that
it is an integral part of the Asian economic integration process. India, Australia,
and New Zealand have lobbied China actively for inclusion in this process,2 9
thus indicating their perception of China as a potential leader in this regard.
Whether China will be the sole leader of Asian economic regionalism remains an
unanswered question. However, China is certainly trying to lead, and it has good
reason to do so.

23

Tan, 53 Intl & Comp L Q at 961 (cited in note 19).

24

Byung-Woon Lyou, Building the NortheastAsian Communiy, 11 Ind J Global Legal Studies 257, 303

25

26

(2004).
See Tan, 53 Ind & Comp L Q at 965 (cited in note 19) ("There is a lack of what is termed the
Inucleus', like the German[y]-France axis in the EU and the 'nucleus' role played by the US in
NAFTA.").
Cheow, 5.2 China Brief 3 (cited in note 4).

28

Id.
Hisane Masaki, China,Japan Tug-ofWar over Indocbina, Asia Times (Oct 5, 2005), available online at

29

<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GJ05Dh03.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Cheow, 5.2 China Brief (cited in note 4).

27
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III. THE RATIONALE BEHIND CHINA'S
LEADERSHIP ASPIRATIONS

In order to understand why China seeks to lead Asian regional economic
integration, one must initially ask why Asian countries want a regional economic
grouping in the first place. Much of the early impetus for the development of an
Asian-Pacific economic grouping arose from the inadequacies of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").3 ° The GATT lacked an institutional
identity and a permanent adjudicative body, resulting in interstate bargaining
being the primary means of dispute resolution. In turn, a country's bargaining
power depended on its relative economic and political clout in the international
community, rather than the relative merits of its claim. As a result, more
powerful Western countries often triumphed regardless of the merits of their
claims.31
Additionally, Asian leaders have been inspired by the creation and
development of other regional trading blocs, while recognizing the economic
and socio-political benefits to regional trade generally. The apparent success of
the EU and NAFTA did not go unnoticed by Asian leaders.32 Moreover, a
regional economic grouping would generate positive trade effects. It could, for
example, expand trade within the regional economic grouping and shift trade
from outside the grouping to within the grouping.3 3 Asian economic regionalism
would also strengthen Asian countries' positions in intergovernmental
organizations as well.34
China's leadership aspirations in the arena of Asian economic regionalism
are based on its desire to capture the economic and political benefits of regional
trade. More specifically, leading Asian economic integration would boost China's
domestic economy. Chinese leaders increasingly recognize that a primary benefit
of participating in trade liberalization initiatives is increased competition in
China's domestic market, which would spur badly needed structural reform of
state-owned enterprises. 35 An alliance with ASEAN in particular would have a
strong positive effect on the Chinese economy. Indeed, ASEAN is China's fifth
largest trade partner, and China's trade alliance with ASEAN is projected to

30

Dichter, 16 U PaJ Ind Bus L at 102 (cited in note 12).

31

Id at 106.

32

Id at 99-100.

33

Lyou, 11 Ind J Global Legal Studies at 260 (cited in note 24).

34

Id.

35

Qingjiang Kong, China's WFO Accession and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: The Perspective of a
Chinese Lawyer, 7 J Intl Econ L 839, 843 (2004).
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increase Chinese and ASEAN exports by 50 percent and China's domestic
36
economy by 0.3 percent.
Along with economic benefits, leadership in Asian economic regionalism
also has political ramifications for China. Some Chinese authors have noted that
a desire to counteract US influence is one reason why China is seeking alliances
in Asia.37 The enhancement of China's position in negotiations with the West is
therefore a tangible side effect to China's economic alliances in Asia.
Furthermore, an Asian economic grouping dependent on Chinese
leadership could fulfill China's other objectives involving security and the
resolution of disputes with its neighbors in the region. Indeed, China has already
forged non-economic agreements with ASEAN. For example, in 2002, China
and ASEAN issued the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation
in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues as well as the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. With the non-traditional security
agreement, China sought to address issues such as drug trafficking, human
trafficking, piracy, and arms smuggling, while also strengthening personnel
exchange, training, and joint research on non-traditional security matters.38
Meanwhile, with the latter agreement, China sought to resolve territorial
concerns over islands in the South China Sea. In the South China Sea
Declaration, China and ASEAN member countries agreed, among other things,
''to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means,"
"reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and
overflight above the South China Sea," and to refrain "from action of inhabiting
on the presently uninhabited islands."3 9 Therefore, economic cooperation could
lead, and has led, to beneficial cooperation on other non-economic issues that
are important to China.
More significantly, taking a leadership role in Asian economic integration
would allow China to craft the economic rules of the region, rather than merely
follow them. Given that international economic rules establish the system of
relations between regional neighbors, such rules and the ability to make them are
crucial to China's national interests. If China does not assume a position of
leadership in Asian regionalism, it may be forced to follow economic rules

36

Id at 842-43.

37

Id at 844.
Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperationin the Field of Non-TraditionalSecurity Issues, art

38

11(1) (Nov 4, 2002), available online at <http://www.aseansec.org/13186.htm> (visited Jan 15,
2007).
39

Declaration on the Conduct of Parliesin the South China Sea, decl 3-5 (Nov 4, 2002), available online at
<http://www.aseansec.org/13165.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
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promulgated by other, possibly rival countries. As one Chinese law professor
summarized:
Indeed, China is fully aware of its limited national strength vis-A-vis Japan in
the region. But it is also aware that if it refrains from playing a leading role
in rule-making for the region until its economy becomes developed, then
China will possibly have to follow the rules decided by other countries. In
other words, should China not initiate formation of a regional arrangement,
it would have no other alternative but to accept the existing rules in the
future. From the perspective of Realpolitik, it is understandable that China
tries to preempt the right to participate in rule-making by taking the
initative.10
China and its competitors' vision of Realpolitik then is not based on blood and
iron but on strategic diplomacy.
IV.

BREAKING THE ENEMY'S RESISTANCE WITHOUT

FIGHTING: OBSTACLES TO CHINESE LEADERSHIP AND
AGREEMENTS WITH ASEAN

Although China has demonstrated that it has both an impetus and the
resolve to lead the Asian regionalism movement, its ascension to the position of
sole leader in this regard is far from guaranteed because it faces several obstacles
to its leadership aspirations. In particular, Japan has desires for primacy in Asian
economic policy (if only to frustrate China's plans), Taiwan has shown that it is a
necessary but unwilling partner, and South Korea has the potential to be the
dark horse in this race to lead the Asian-Pacific region to an economic
community akin to the EU and NAFTA. However, China has been the first
among the Plus Three countries to forge a host of comprehensive agreements
with ASEAN, a vital component of Asian economic integration, which may help
China overcome these barriers.

A. JAPAN
Japan and China have a rivalry that is rooted deeply in history, and it
evinces no signs of abatement. The possibility that China may eclipse Japan as
Asia's economic leader has generated new anti-Chinese sentiments that permeate

40

Kong, 7 J Intl Econ L at 846 (cited in note 35). China has already demonstrated its refusal to
follow the political rules of other countries. For example, in his speech at Yale University in April
2006, President Hu Jintao, though he sought to suppress apprehension about the effects of
China's ascendancy, was adamant that China would not follow US instructions for political
development, stating in Chinese, "On one hand, we are ready and willing to draw on the useful
experience of foreign countries. On the other hand, we will not simply copy the political models
of other countries." See Joseph Kahn, In Hu's Visit to the U.S., Small Gaffes May Overshadow Small
Gains, NY Times A8 (Apr 22, 2006).
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Japanese society.41 This intense competition, in part, drives Japan's concurrent
leadership aspirations. While the institutions of Asian regionalism were still in
the nascent stages of development, Japan appeared to be the most promising
candidate for leading Asian-Pacific economic integration. It has also continued
to forge trade liberalization agreements with its neighbors. In other words, Japan
is a threat to Chinese leadership in Asian economic regionalism because of its
early leadership potential and its ongoing efforts to frustrate China's plans
through competing economic agreements with its counterparts in the area.
During the 1990s, the formative years of Asian regionalism, Japan was
ahead of its neighbors in the quest for leadership in economic integration. Japan
was a member of APEC before the three Chinese economies-China, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan-were admitted to the regional association. Furthermore,
Japan had been, and still is, the primary source of multinational investment
capital in Asia.42 Additionally, the Japanese economy was impressive enough that
this factor alone was thought to be sufficient for Japanese leadership in
economic regionalism. According to one observer, "The Japanese market has
the size and wealth to induce the nations of East and Southeast Asia to agree to
bind themselves in a supranational legal framework with a membership based on
the [East Asian Economic Grouping]." 43 Japan was therefore a logical choice to
lead economic integration in the Asian-Pacific region.
For a time, Japan looked to the West, regarding the EU and the US as its
primary trading partners. However, China's economic ascendancy and apparent
leadership aspirations have spurred Japan in its more recent rapprochements
with other Asian countries. A year after the 2001 ASEAN-China Summit in
Brunei Darussalam, Japan and ASEAN issued their Joint Declaration of the
Leaders of ASEAN and Japan on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership. It
stated in part:
We recognized that, for the creation of economic partnerships and linkages
of a leading nature between ASEAN and Japan, ASEAN and Japan should
seek broad-based economic partnership covering not only liberalization of
trade and investment but also trade and investment promotion and
facilitation measures, including, but not limited to customs procedures,
standards and conformance, non-tariff measures, and co-operation in other
areas, such as financial services, information and communications

41

42

43
44

See Norimitsu Onishi, Ugly Images of Asian Rivals become Best Sellers in Japan, NY Times Al (Nov 19,
2005) ("Today, China and South Korea's rise to challenge Japan's position as Asia's economic,
diplomatic, and cultural leader is inspiring renewed xenophobia against them here.").
Dichter 16 U Pa J Intl Bus L at 149 (cited in note 12); Fischer, 13 Duke J Comp & Intl L at 359
(cited in note 11).
Dichter, 16 U PaJ Intl Bus L at 149 (cited in note 12).
Lyou, 11 Ind J Global Legal Studies at 265 (cited in note 24).
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technology, science and technology, human resource development, small

45
and medium enterprises, tourism, transport, energy and food security.

Moreover, in the wake of China's 2002 negotiations with ASEAN regarding a
free trade area, Japan quickly agreed to a free trade area with ASEAN member
Singapore, resulting in the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement.46
In addition, Japan has put aside its rivalry with its Northeast Asian neighbor,
eagerly touting the Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement. 47 More recently, in
September 2005, Japan initiated periodic economic ministerial meetings with
four of the least-developed ASEAN members, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and
Vietnam (collectively "CLMV").4 8 Japan and CLMV agreed on a new set of
Japanese aid programs to modernize the Mekong River area, including help in
building a production and distribution system and assisting intra-regional trade
through the use of tags that utilize radio frequency identification. 49
Japan's private sector has also improved the country's ties to Southeast
Asia. For instance, several companies in Japan's automotive, electrical and
electronic, and food processing industries-including Toyota, Honda, and
Sony-have participated actively in the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation
("AICO' program, which gives the output of cooperative arrangements (the socalled "approved AICO products") preferential tariff rates and unfettered access

to participating countries' markets. '0 Furthermore, Japan has contributed to the
AICO scheme by providing foreign direct investment to the automotive and
electronic sectors."' Through these vehicles, Japan has signaled its desire for
greater cooperation in Asia and renewed efforts to lead economic integration in
the region, which has perpetuated the rivalry between China and Japan. 2

45

Joint Declaration of the Leaders of ASEAN and Japan on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership,deci 4
(Nov 5, 2002), available online at <http://www.aseansec.org/13191.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).

46

See Nohyoung Park, Overiew on the State of WTO Dipute Settlement Involving the ASEAN+3, in
Mitsuo Matsushita and Dukgeun Ahn, eds, IfTO and East Asia: New Perspectives 241, 242
(Cameron May 2004) ("After China agreed to create an PTA with the ASEAN, Japan became
concerned about the possibility of losing leadership over the East Asia economic integration.
Therefore, Japan promptly agreed to an FTA with Singapore ....). The full text of the
agreement is available online at <http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gJ-SFTAle.pdf>
(visited Jan 15, 2007).

47

Lyou, 11 Ind J Global Legal Studies at 265 (cited in note 24).
Masaki, China,Japan Tug-of-War, Asia Times 2 (cited in note 28).

48
49

Id

50

Tan, 53 Intl & Comp L Q at 942 (cited in note 19).

51

Id at 943.

52

See Masaki, China, Japan Tug-of-War, Asia Times

5.

43 (cited in note 28) ("Amid growing talk of

creating an [EAC] in recent years, Japan and China have been jockeying for the leadership role in
what will be the long and arduous process of community building. And the two Asian powers
have competed for stronger and doser ties with ASEAN.").

Winter 2007

ChicagoJournalof InternalionalLaw

China has responded in kind to Japan's overtures to ASEAN countries.
Like Japan, it too has offered a financial assistance program for the development
of the Mekong River sub-region.5 3 Perhaps in a bid to outdo its archrival, China
also forgave Cambodia's estimated $1 billion debt, and in July 2005 announced
that it would broaden the array of products from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar
eligible for preferential tariffs.5 a Additionally, China has signed many agreements
with CLMV and Thailand to foster cooperation on issues such as transportation,
building an information superhighway, and power trade.5 5 Consistent with a
policy of playing the part of a gentle giant in its courtship of ASEAN members,
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao summarized China's wishes by stating
somewhat poetically, "[m]ay our friendship and cooperation run as long and
deep as the Lancang-Mekong River," and "[a] close neighbor is more helpful
than a distant relative. 5 6
In contrast to their militaristic and violent relationship in the past, China
and Japan are currently engaged in a war of statecraft. Whether China can
surpass Japan as the head of Asian economic integration is not yet evident, as
Japan refuses to relinquish its competitive position in the region. What is certain,
however, is that diplomacy is of prime importance. Both countries have
demonstrated that they are adept at using it to forge strategic cooperation, to
facilitate their respective bids for leadership, and, on some occasions, to raise
their opponent's ire.
B. TAIWAN
At a parliamentary committee meeting in March 2006, Japanese Foreign
Minister Taro Aso remarked, "[Taiwan's] democracy is considerably matured
and liberal economics is deeply ingrained, so it is a law-abiding country. In
various ways it is a country that shares a sense of values with Japan. 5 7 It was a
comment that generated such headlines in China's state-run media as "China
'shocked' by remarks of Japanese FM"58 and scathing, though unsubstantiated,
statements such as "[i]ntemational news media say Aso lacks the required basic
political qualifications as a foreign minister because he frequently goes back on

53

Id 7 32, 33.

54

Id

55

Id 736.

34, 35.

56

Id

57

Japan-China Row Turns to Taiwan, BBC News (Mar 9, 2006), available online at <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4789072.stm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).

37, 38.

58

China "Shocked" by Remarks ofJapaneseFM, Xinhua News Agency (Mar 9, 2006), available online at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-03/09/content4282378.htm>

(visited Jan 15, 2007).

Vol. 7 No. 2

Achieving Supreme Excellence

Cben

his own words." 9 Aso's comment also captured the essence of what makes
Taiwan an obstacle to Chinese leadership of Asian economic regionalism: that
Taiwan is economically vital to China and to the region yet unofficially regards
itself, and is regarded by others, as a de facto independent country, functionally
separate and distinct from China.
Taiwan's economic importance to China and the Asian region is due to its
growing economy and status as a primary regional exporter and importer.
Indeed, the Republic of China's Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and
Statistics indicated the country's 2006 economic growth rate was a strong 4.39
percent. Moreover, Taiwan could count mainland China, Hong Kong, Japan,
and Singapore as four of its top five export targets in 2004.61 That same year,
Taiwanese exports to Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam exceeded well over one billion dollars for
each country. 62itTaiwan itself is a key destination for neighboring countries'
products. In 2004, for example, Japan, mainland China, and Indonesia were
among the top exporters to Taiwan. 63 That same year, imports to Taiwan from
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand surpassed two
billion dollars for each country. 64 Taiwan is therefore an economic powerhouse,
and a fundamental component of the Asian economic system.
In its quest to assume leadership of Asian economic integration, China may
need Taiwan to a greater degree than that to which Taiwan is amenable. At best,
Taiwan is a reluctant, if not unwilling, Chinese partner. It seeks to maintain
stable separation from China, which could limit the ultimate degree of regional
integration. 65 Compounding China's difficulties with its cross-strait rival,
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Taiwan's President, Chen Shui-bian, has signaled the possibility of de jure
independence for the island. He has, for instance, rejected the "One China"
principle, which he believes undermines Taiwan's own sovereignty.66 More
recently, in what China perceived as an act of defiance, President Chen ended
the National Unification Council and the Guidelines for National Unification,
both of which had been effectively defunct yet important symbols of the island's
political connection to the Mainland.6" At a minimum, Taiwan's tendencies
toward independence are a minor distraction to China's larger objectives for
Asia, diverting diplomatic energy to issues of cross-strait relations rather than to
its efforts to drive Asian economic regionalism forward. However, China's
inability to rein in Taiwan's separatist identity could also pose a complete
obstacle to Chinese leadership in crafting an Asian-Pacific economic bloc by
frustrating China-led plans for integration and altering other countries'
perceptions of the Mainland's leadership capabilities.
Already, other countries and institutions tread a fine line between
appeasing China and acknowledging Taiwan's de facto, and nearly de jure,
independent sovereignty, which indicates the limits of Chinese power as well as
the importance of Taiwan in international relations. Even though China does
not recognize the island as a separate country, Taiwan still maintains formal
diplomatic relations with twenty-four nations.68 Numerous countries have
established unofficial diplomatic organizations in order to engage in commercial
relations with Taiwan, which is represented in 122 countries. 69 Furthermore, at
least one major regional economic association, APEC, has bypassed the issue of
Taiwanese independence through some diplomatic maneuvering and semantics.
It included Taiwan separately from China in its membership by using the term
"member economy" instead of "member country" or "member state. 70 That so
many nations are willing to circumvent the Mainland's "One China" policy is a
sign of Taiwan's economic significance both regionally and globally.
China apparently recognizes Taiwan's distinct presence and has taken steps
to counteract this rival's separate ascendancy in the region's economic affairs,
again utilizing agreements rather than resorting to a show of military force.
Indeed, China has assumed a less aggressive stance toward its cross-strait
neighbor in recent years. It has seemingly resigned itself to allowing Taiwan to
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be functionally, though not formally, independent.7 1 A more outwardly
harmonious relationship with the Republic of China may be part of the
Mainland's larger plan to bolster its leadership prospects. As some analysts have
observed, "[i]f the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 were held against a
background of rapprochement across the strait, that would greatly assist China's
efforts to project itself as a responsible world power. ' 7 2 Such projections, as a
component of what is effectively a public relations campaign on a global scale,
could, in turn, build China's reputation as a natural choice to lead an AsianPacific economic bloc.
Instead of focusing on Taiwan itself, China has directed more diplomatic
attention to regional economic agreements, especially with ASEAN, as a means
of offsetting Taiwan's strong position in Asia. Specifically, the ASEAN-China
Framework Agreement (discussed infra), with its attendant increased market
opportunities, could cause an exodus of Taiwan-based businesses to the
Mainland. 73 Burgeoning, China-initiated regional trade agreements may lead to
the wholesale exclusion of Taiwan, creating a China-centric economic system in
the area.74 Moreover, such economic exclusion of the island through China's
amicable relations with ASEAN could, in effect, suppress Taiwan's leanings
toward independence.7 ' Thus, China's pursuit of agreements with ASEAN
appears to be a fruitful strategy both economically and politically. It could prove
that a form of Asian economic integration is possible without Taiwan, but given
Taiwan's economic and financial importance to the region, such a bloc seems
unlikely to be successful in balancing similar Western institutions. Undoubtedly,
an Asian economic bloc would be comparatively weak and incomplete without
Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea.

71

See Muted Celebration, Economist at 45 (cited in note 66) (noting that China has implied that "the

72

status quo would be tolerable," whereas "[i]n the past, China has threatened war against Taiwan
simply for refusing to talk."); Separate Ways, Economist at 12 (cited in note 65) (noting that
China's "one country, two systems" idea "isno longer pushed quite as aggressively as before" and
that one of its "most authoritative pronouncements on Taiwan policy in recent years ... did not
mention 'one country, two systems"' and abstained from "railing against Taiwan's de facto
independence.").
Separate Ways, Economist at 12 (cited in note 65).

73

Kong, 7 J Intl Econ L at 844 (cited in note 35).

74

See Killion, 31 NC J Intl L & Coin Reg at 50 (cited in note 4) ("Taiwan faces the threat of Beijing
building an Asian strategic order centered on China, because Beijing remains highly sensitive
about the dejure and defacto recognition of Taiwan's legitimacy through participation in regional
and international dialogues.").

75

Kong, 7 J Intl Econ L at 844 (cited in note 35).

Winter 2007

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

C. KOREA
As part of the ASEAN Plus Three framework, the Republic of Korea has
been an important, though often overlooked, partner in Asian economic
relations. Korea warrants greater attention as a possible candidate for leading
Asian economic integration because of its longstanding investment relationship
and recent efforts toward formalized cooperation with ASEAN. As early as
1968, just one year after ASEAN's founding, Korea began overseas direct
investment in the region through the Korea South Development Corporation.7 6
Korea's investment in ASEAN declined during the early 1990s because of the
Asian financial crisis and the country's increased investment in China after the
normalization of Chinese-Korean diplomatic relations.77 Yet ASEAN is currently
third among Korea's foreign direct investment targets, and ASEAN members
have received more than 25 percent of Korea's official development assistance. 8
Like China and Japan, Korea has therefore demonstrated its willingness to
expend financial resources in order to encourage cordial ties to what is the most
plausible vehicle for regional integration.
Given the substantial history of Korea's involvement with Southeast Asian
countries, ASEAN is unsurprisingly amenable to formal cooperative agreements
with such a durable financial supporter. Just as China and Japan have been
proactive in pursuing agreements with ASEAN members, Korea has sought
aggressively to keep pace with its Plus Three counterparts. During its "rush to
catch up on free trade agreements," it completed successful negotiations with
Japan and Singapore.79 More significantly, in December 2005, Korea and
ASEAN entered into a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation, which established the Korea-ASEAN Free Trade Area.80 Korea's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was quick to compare its position to that
of China, noting, "[a]lthough Korea initiated negotiations with ASEAN three
years later than China, it has reached agreements to establish free trade zones by
2010, just [like] China." 81 In what is perhaps the most striking indication of
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Korea's competitive leadership aspirations, the Ministry further declared that
"the Korea-ASEAN [Free Trade Agreement] will connect Northeast Asian and
Southeast Asian markets centering in Korea and create a foundation for the
establishment of the East Asian Community. We further believe that the [Free
Trade Agreement] will contribute to Korea's rise as the hub of regional cooperation in
Asia.,8 2 Thus, while China may have had a head start in unifying negotiations
with ASEAN, Korea has the motivation to supersede it.
Besides competition from China, Korea has other incentives to lead
cooperation with ASEAN in the form of oil, trade dependence, and a boost to
its domestic economy. ASEAN is Korea's biggest oil provider and also supplies
two-thirds of the liquefied natural gas that the country consumes.8 3 Furthermore,
Korea is highly dependent on trade,84 and ASEAN is Korea's fourth-ranked
export market.85 The Korea-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement is expected to result
in a $10 billion increase in Korean exports to ASEAN 86 and a 0.13 percent rise
in Korea's gross domestic product.87 Given these tangible benefits, Korea, like
China, has an economic impetus to direct the charge toward economic
regionalism through symbiotic formalized agreements with ASEAN members. It
therefore has potential to be the unexpected leader of Asian economic
integration, though not without persistent competition from China.
D. CHINA'S AGREEMENTS WITH ASEAN
According to one journalist, "China is driving intra-Asian economic
integration through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ....

To sweeten

the economic bonds, China has not been too pushy in other areas, stepping
politely to address its strategic and diplomatic goals as it seeks the affections of
surrounding countries." The outcome of such coy gamesmanship has been
favorable to China, which has concluded a series of agreements with ASEAN
ahead of its closest rivals. These agreements, which may be loosely categorized
as fundamental agreements, agreements with economic side effects, and general
cooperation agreements, have been designed to facilitate cooperation on
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multiple fronts, possibly entrenching China's status as the frontrunner in the
competition to lead regional integration.
1. Fundamental Agreements
China's fundamental agreements with ASEAN include the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and the Agreement on
Trade in Goods. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs heralded the
Framework Agreement, which was signed on November 4, 2002, as "a
milestone," signifying that "China-ASEAN economic and trade cooperation
ha[d] entered a new historic stage."8 9 True to its name, the Framework
Agreement includes a set of objectives, specific measures for comprehensive
economic cooperation, a schedule of goods and tariff rates, provisions on tradein-services, and a timeframe establishing a China-ASEAN free trade area by
2010 for older ASEAN members and 2015 for newer ASEAN members. 90
Moreover, the Framework Agreement strengthens cooperation in five priority
sectors, namely agriculture, information and communications technology,
human resources development, investment, and Mekong River basin
development, as well as several other areas. 91 As such, the Framework
Agreement has been the foundation for extensive cooperation between China
and ASEAN on numerous issues, pushing forward a more complete form of
regionalism that encompasses more than just economic integration.
Meanwhile, the Agreement on Trade in Goods, which was signed on
November 29, 2004, will further facilitate a China-ASEAN free trade area.
China's state-run media report that this resulting free trade area will have an
impressive gross domestic product of $1.8 trillion and a trade volume of $1.2
trillion.92 More tellingly, it "will allow all members to enjoy more favorable
treatment in trade and investment than the World Trade Organization can
offer."9 3 In addition, the Agreement on Trade in Goods recognizes China as a
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"full market economy, ' 9 4 perhaps auguring other countries' changing
perceptions about China and the role of its government in its economic policy.
2. Agreements with Economic Side Effects
Some of China and ASEAN's agreements with economic side effects
include the Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural Cooperation and
the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Information and
Communications Technology. The terms of these temporary agreements
indicate that China continues to play the part of a gracious benefactor in its
interactions with ASEAN. In particular, the agricultural agreement provides that
China will conduct training courses for ASEAN members and that China will
supply machinery as well as the bulk of financing to cover the international
travel expenses of both Chinese and ASEAN agricultural specialists, with no
reciprocal provisions on ASEAN's part.9" Similarly, pursuant to the information
and communications technology agreement, China will open its domestic
training bases to educate ASEAN personnel and "will actively assist and
facilitate the construction and development of information infrastructure such as
fixed/mobile communications networks, multimedia applications, and Internet
in ASEAN Member Countries. 96
3. General Cooperation Agreements
The Joint Declaration and subsidiary Plan of Action to Implement the
Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity are together one of the general cooperation agreements between
these parties. The Joint Declaration reflects the signatories' mutual
acknowledgment that "the relationship between ASEAN and China has seen

rapid, comprehensive, and in-depth growth and ASEAN and China have
become important partners of cooperation. 97 The Plan of Action is a master
plan that details the parties' joint strategy on cooperation in the realms of
politics, security, economics, regional and international affairs, and a
94

Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China, art 14 (Nov 29, 2004),
available online at <http://www.aseansec.org/16647.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).

95

Memorandum of Understandingbetween the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN)Secretariatand
the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China on Agricultural Cooperation, arts 1-4 (Nov 2,
2002), available online at <http://www.aseansec.org/13215.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Memorandum of Understandingbetween the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations and the People's Repub& of

96

China on Cooperation in Information and Communications Technology, arts 11(1), (2) (Oct 8, 2003),
available online at <http://www.aseansec.org/l5148.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
97

Joint Declaration of the Heads of State!Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the
People's Republic of China on Strategic Partnershipfor Peace and Prospetioy, 1 (Oct 8, 2003), available
online at <http://www.aseansec.org/15266.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).

Winter 2007

ChicagoJournalof InternafionalLaw

miscellaneous category of "functional cooperation" that covers matters as wideranging as public health, culture, media, and youth exchanges.98
Collectively, the comprehensive body of agreements between China and
ASEAN is firm evidence that an exclusively Asian regional association on equal
footing with the EU and NAFTA is not far from fruition. Chinese leadership of
Asian economic integration is no longer a pipe dream either. However, the other
components of the ASEAN Plus Three framework, Japan and Korea, should
not be underestimated. They have demonstrated their potential to lead as well.
While the agreements have been mutually beneficial to the parties, the true
winner may ultimately be ASEAN, which has reaped the benefits of the Plus
Three rivalry.
V. CONCLUSION
China has attempted to achieve supreme excellence by breaking its
enemies' resistance, not by fighting in the most conventional usage of the term,
but through agreements with ASEAN. Yet China has been fighting its
"enermies" in another sense. It has been unable to put aside its animus toward
Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. China's perception of its counterparts as obstacles or
competitors could limit both the scope and depth of regional cooperation. Thus,
the real path to supreme excellence is for China to unify divergent regional
interests through sincere, transparent diplomacy. The success of Asian economic
integration depends on it.
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